New York Attorney General Letitia James proposed rules to protect consumers and small businesses from corporate profiteering.
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The rules would strengthen enforcement of New York’s price gouging law, which was updated in 2020 to grant the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) rulemaking authority.
The proposed rules will make it more straightforward to investigate and combat price gouging by setting clear guardrails against price increases during emergencies. The proposed rules are a continuation of Attorney General James’ efforts to protect consumers and are open to a 60-day public comment period.
New York’s price gouging law bans companies throughout the supply chain from taking advantage of a market disruption to increase their profits for vital and necessary goods and services.
The statute asserts that an abnormal market disruption is caused by extreme weather events, military action, energy disruptions, strikes, or national or local emergencies, or another event that leads to a declared state of emergency.
In 2020, the New York State Legislature amended the law to empower OAG with rulemaking authority.
In March 2022, OAG launched the first-ever price gouging rulemaking process to gather information from consumers and industry experts on how to strengthen and clarify the state’s price gouging statute.
The proposed rules announced are informed by OAG’s decades of experience enforcing the price gouging statute and by the public comments submitted by advocates, trade groups, and economic experts. The proposed rules include actions to:
Clarify that a price increase over 10 percent during an abnormal market disruption may constitute price gouging. State law asserts that when there is a “gross disparity†in prices before and after an abnormal market disruption, it may be price gouging.
By stating that a 10 percent increase represents a “gross disparity,†the proposed rule makes it easier for consumers and small businesses to identify and report price gouging, deters price gouging, provides enforcers with an easily administrable standard for enforcing the price gouging statute, and is widely used by other enforcers.
Prohibit corporations with large market shares from increasing profit margins during abnormal market disruptions. The rule clarifies that dominant companies with 30 percent market share, and companies in concentrated markets, have unfair leverage and the power to drive market-wide changes. Therefore, they cannot increase their profits during abnormal market disruptions at the expense of New Yorkers.
Create guardrails for companies that rely on dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing means prices can change depending on demand and time of day, and is favored by some companies, including ride-hailing services. Due to this pricing model, it is currently difficult to determine if a company is price gouging.
This rule allows OAG to establish a benchmark by using the median price for the same good or service at the same time one week before the emergency or market disruption. This will allow for a much quicker analysis of whether illegal price gouging occurred during frequent significant weather events and emergencies that abnormally disrupt service markets that use dynamic pricing.
Include protections for products or services introduced after a market disruption. A new product or service that is created following an emergency can be considered vital and necessary, and therefore can become subject to enforcement of the price gouging statute.
During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, OAG received many complaints about price gouging on goods and services introduced in response to the pandemic, such as COVID-19 at-home tests and medical treatments. These products became vital and necessary after the pandemic started. Future crises also may result in price gouging on new products or services.
Provide clarification for what companies can claim as costs when setting prices. A company that raises their prices more than 10 percent must show a record of their costs to justify the price increase. This rule details what does and does not count as a cost for purposes of an affirmative defense. ■